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ABSTRACT 
False memories are sometimes generated when recalling words from lists in which the 
words are conceptually related. People think of concepts that are associated with the lists but 
which were never presented. Previous research has shown that sad mood reduces false memories 
whereas depression increases false memories, especially to negative information. It is possible 
that false memories represent a cognitive characteristic that is present prior to depression. I 
hypothesized that depressed individuals and those vulnerable to depression would falsely recall 
more negative critical lures than controls. Depressed and vulnerable individuals were not 
expected to perform differently from each other. The results did not support these hypotheses. 
High ruminators recalled significantly fewer critical lures independent of mood or depression. 
This finding possibly suggests that ruminators may have a repetitive focus on the words in the 
lists and do not make extra-list associations.  
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FALSE MEMORIES IN DEPRESSION: VULNERABILITY FACTOR OR SYMPTOM? 
Mood influences memory and can do so differently depending on the task at hand. In 
spatial memory tasks, Gray (2001) found that negative mood improved performance and positive 
mood impaired performance. In verbal tasks, Gray (2001) found that negative mood impaired 
performance and positive mood increased performance. Mood can also influence one’s cognitive 
control. In depression, individuals’ executive functions are compromised in such a way that they 
have to use much more effortful cognitive control than usual and that the process which regulates 
cognitive control is interconnected with the same process that regulates emotion (Banich et al., 
2009). 
 False memories occur when an individual remembers something that never actually 
occurred or remembers something differently than the way it happened (Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm is a false memory paradigm that has 
been used to investigate differences in individuals’ recall of words from lists of neutral, positive, 
or negative words (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The DRM paradigm includes lists that are 
designed to lure individuals into recalling words that are never presented. One example is the list 
of words: castle, queen, horse, and moat. When an individual reads, learns, and then recalls the 
words in this list, they often also recall the critical lure. In this case, the critical lure would be 
“king”, a word not in the list but highly associated with the four words in the list. Generally, the 
probability of recalling critical lures is equal to or greater than the probability of recalling the 
words on the lists (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  
Studies using the DRM paradigm have looked at the influence of mood on true and false 
memories. Storbeck and Clore (2005) induced healthy participants into either positive or 
negative mood states and also had a control condition of non-manipulated mood. In one 
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experiment, participants were instructed to write down only words that they remembered from 
the lists. Results revealed that those in the negative mood condition were less likely to recall 
false memories or critical lures than participants in the positive mood or non-manipulated 
conditions. Therefore, negative mood reduced levels of false memory. Storbeck and Clore (2005) 
attributed these results to the claims that negative affect prompts item-specific processing so that 
other items are less likely to come to mind during the task.  
In contrast, it has been suggested that positive affect prompts global processing so it is 
more likely that other items will come to mind (Arndt & Reder, 2003; Hege & Dodson, 2004). In 
Storbeck and Clore’s (2005) second experiment, participants were instructed to recall words 
from the list but to also report any other words that came to mind. This was done to determine if 
the effect of mood occurred at encoding or retrieval. Their results were the same as in the first 
experiment, thus revealing that the effect occurs at encoding of the words rather than at retrieval 
of the words.  This can be concluded because the difference between mood groups in the number 
of reported critical lures stayed the same when participants were instructed to list both critical 
lures and list words. This shows that in the negative mood group, the critical lures were not as 
accessible at encoding as they were in the positive group. At encoding, fewer words were put in 
to memory rather than inhibited during retrieval.  
 An important consideration is how the concept of false memories may apply to 
individuals with emotional disorders. Depression is associated with memory impairments. 
Depressed participants typically recall less material than nondepressed controls (Burt, Zembar, & 
Niederehe, 1995) and are biased toward negative events when episodic memory is tested (Hertel, 
2004). Depression is associated with difficulties in cognitive control, especially difficulty 
inhibiting irrelevant negative material as well as exhibiting attentional biases toward mood-
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congruent material making mood-congruent material more memorable and mood-incongruent 
material less accessible (Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Hertel, 2004; Matthews & MacLeod, 
2005). Because depressed individuals are more likely to think of negative self-ideas when sad, it 
is possible that the increased availability of negative ideas would lead to an increased likelihood 
of reporting false memories.  
 Joormann, Teachman, and Gotlib (2009) investigated this by using the DRM paradigm 
with a sample of healthy controls and individuals diagnosed with major depressive disorder 
(MDD). Individuals suffering from MDD recalled fewer words from all lists than the control 
group, but most prominently in the condition that consisted of positively valenced words. Also, 
the MDD participants falsely recalled significantly more critical lures in the negative word 
condition compared to controls, but not in the positive or neutral word conditions. These findings 
contradict those of Storbeck and Clore (2005) and suggest that depression is different from a 
general sad mood in its impact on memory.  
Howe and Malone (2011) obtained similar findings. Participants with MDD compared to 
healthy controls recalled significantly more critical lures from the depression-relevant lists. They 
did not differ on correct recall of presented words in any of the conditions in comparison to 
controls. This replication is an important demonstration of the reliability of the false memory 
effect. Furthermore, the results of both studies are consistent with the idea that depression 
involves an increased availability and accessibility of negatively valenced semantic content. The 
increased availability and accessibility of that information makes it more likely for depressed 
individuals to falsely recall critical lures.  
 It has been observed that those who are depressed are more susceptible to false memories 
during the recall of negatively valenced words whereas healthy individuals induced into a sad 
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mood are less susceptible to false memories under the same conditions.  The difference can be 
explained through the activation-monitoring framework where the encoding and retrieval of 
information are affected by the activation and monitoring processes (Roediger et al., 2001). 
During the encoding of a list, semantic activation processes can lead items to come to mind that 
were not presented in the list. When critical lures or other false memories come to mind, they can 
be encoded as having the same features as the words in the list. By presenting a list of words, an 
activation of information occurs where the individual creates associations in error (Roediger et 
al., 2001).  
Difficulties in monitoring or determining the source of the words which come to mind 
may lead to memories of words which were thought of, but which were not seen in the list. At 
retrieval, words that were stored as having been seen due to a strong activation at encoding are 
recovered falsely (Jacoby et al., 1989). In sum, since the critical lures are strongly activated 
during encoding, monitoring them at retrieval deems more difficult and resulting in the 
production of false memories (Roediger et al. 2001).  
Since depression is associated with an increased activation of negative material, one can 
assume that depressed individuals would have difficulties correctly encoding and retrieving 
information. The negative material presented may activate a large amount of information that 
may have similar features to the words presented so the individual stores those thought of words 
as actual list words. At retrieval, the depressed individual is then more likely to incorrectly 
monitor the source of the word since it was so strongly activated during encoding (Roediger et 
al., 2001).  
 From the research, we can see that depression is associated with impaired memory when 
determining the source of negative material. Individuals with depression respond differently than 
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healthy controls in induced moods on false memory tasks. What we do not know is whether this 
difference in memory exists prior to experiencing depression or a result of depression. Do 
individuals who are vulnerable to depression have the same false memory impairments as 
individuals diagnosed with MDD? The present study sought to examine this question.  
 Rumination is a maladaptive form of self-reflection that occurs when individuals respond 
to a negative situation by repetitively focusing on potential causes and consequences of the 
situation without considering a solution (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Mor & Winquist, 2002). 
Rumination has been shown to be associated with and predictive of depressive episodes. The 
Response Styles Theory states that ruminative tendencies remain stable in individuals who are 
depressed even when change in depression occurs (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 
1993). Individuals who have a tendency to ruminate are more likely to interpret negative 
situations as more negative than they actually were (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 
1993). It is also suggested that rumination might be associated with memory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).   
Abela and Hankin (2004) found that individuals scoring higher on measures of 
rumination had a higher probability of experiencing a major depressive episode and episodes of 
greater duration when compared to individuals scoring low on measures of rumination. It is also 
suggested that having the tendency to ruminate impairs cognitive and behavioral performance 
along with worsening depressive symptoms (Auerbach, Webb, Gordiner, & Pechtel, 2013). 
Having a high tendency to ruminate should lead to a focus on negative information and an 
increased activation of negative constructs. Therefore, like depressed individuals, individuals 
who have a high tendency to ruminate, making them vulnerable to depression, would be 
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expected to perform similarly to depressed participants on the DRM, which is to show higher 
false memories on negatively valenced word lists. 
Students who were low and high in rumination, but were not nor had ever been depressed 
were exposed to the DRM task under positive (content) and negative (sad) emotions.  I 
hypothesized that those scoring high on a measure of rumination would perform in a pattern 
similar to the MDD participants in Joormann et al. (2009) and Howe and Malone (2011) when 
induced in a negative mood by recalling more negative critical lures than individuals scoring low 
on a measure of rumination who would report fewer critical lures in an induced negative mood. I 
also recruited a sample of depressed individuals.  I hypothesized that those considered depressed 
would also report more critical lures on the negative list in comparison to those low in 
rumination, but would not differ from those who were high in rumination. Support for the above 
hypotheses may suggest that the memory impairments present in individuals with MDD began as 
a vulnerability factor for their depression rather than develop as a symptom of their depression. 
Method 
Recruitment 
 Undergraduate participants were recruited through a one-time online survey. The survey 
included a request for respondents to agree to be contacted for participation in a follow-up study. 
The screening surveyed 616 students.  
  A demographics questionnaire, a measure of the tendency to ruminate (Ruminative 
Responses Scale), a measure of depression (Beck Depression Inventory), and a substance abuse 
screening tool (CAGE Assessment) were administered in that order. These measures are 
described in detail below. Other measures for a separate study were included; however, they 
were not used in the analyses of this study so they will not further be mentioned. There were also 
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two questions concerning each individual’s history of depression as follows: 1) Are you 
currently being treated for depression? and 2) Have you ever been depressed?  
 At the end of the survey, students were given an educational debriefing on research 
methods and the value of participating in research.  
Participants 
 Three types of individuals were recruited for participation in the laboratory study of 
memory. These included: 1) never depressed, low ruminating individuals, 2) those who scored 
high on the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) but have never been depressed, and 3) those who 
at the time reported high levels of depressive symptoms.  
 Individuals scoring 10 or above on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) were invited to 
participate. Individuals scoring across a continuum on the RRS and 3 or below on the BDI were 
also invited. Individuals who scored 2 or above on the CAGE were not invited to participate to 
rule out alcohol abuse as a potential confound. Individuals were excluded if they were not fluent 
in English, were not 18 years or older, or if they reported a history of severe head trauma. Full 
participant data can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. Characteristics of Participants 
 Group 
Variable Full Sample Low Ruminators High Ruminators Depressed 
N (female) 82 (37) 28 (14) 30 (9) 24 (10) 
Age (M, SD) 19.9 (3.37) 19.18 (.97) 20.93 (5.14) 19.46 (3.37) 
% Caucasian 85.7 92.9 76.7 87.5 
BDI (M, SD) 5.35 (7.79) 0.61 (1.01) 1.03 (1.05) 16.29 (5.94) 
RRS (M, SD) 37.13 (11.37) 25.64 (2.27) 37.53 (5.48) 50.04 (8.80) 
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale.  
 
Treatment of Human Subjects 
 Informed consent was obtained from all participants and all were fully debriefed at the 
end of the experiment. All participants were treated in accordance with American Psychological 
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Association’s ethical code of conduct and guidelines. Participants were awarded course credit or 
$10 for participation.  
 All participants in the laboratory portion of the study were educated about the nature of 
depression. All participants were given a brochure that described depression, treatment options, 
and listed area resources. A graduate student trained in the assessment of depression and suicide 
risk provided individual feedback to those who fell in the depressed range on the screening 
measure of depression. Those who responded affirmatively to the suicide item on the BDI were 
further evaluated for suicide risk. If it was determined that the participant was not in imminent 
danger, a further debriefing was provided encouraging visiting the counseling center on campus. 
If the participant was in imminent danger, a discussion about the importance of intervention 
would ensue in order to solicit agreement to hospitalization. There were no incidents in which a 
participant needed hospitalization. If there had been such an incident, a plan was in place in 
accordance to university standards to have campus police be called to escort the participant to a 
local emergency room.  
Materials 
 Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS). The RRS is a 22-item scale of the Response Styles 
Questionnaire. Respondents are asked to describe how they typically cope with negative mood 
by responding to items on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). A 
single total score is derived by summing the responses to the 22 items. Scores range from 22 to 
88 with higher scores indicating more rumination. The RRS is a continuous measure so there is 
no distinct cut-off score. The items on the RRS describe responses that are self-focused, 
symptom focused, and focused on consequences of the individual’s mood. The RRS has shown 
good construct validity and test-retest reliability, acceptable convergent, predictive and 
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discriminant validity, and high levels of internal consistency (α > .89) (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Davis, 1999; Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991).  
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The BDI is a 21-question multiple choice self-report 
questionnaire that measures the severity of depression. Each item consists of four sentences 
describing a particular symptom arranged in order of severity. Respondents choose the sentence 
that most closely describes their experience over the last two weeks. Each item is scored on a 0-3 
scale. All items are summed to form a total score that can range from 0-63 with higher scores 
reflecting greater levels of depressive symptomatology. A score equal to or greater than 10 
places an individual in the dysphoric range (Beck, 1978). The BDI has been shown to have good 
internal consistency with mean coefficient alphas of .81-.86. The concurrent validity of the BDI 
has also been found to be high with mean correlations of .60-.74 (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988).  
State–Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA)-State Version. The 
STICSA-State is the 21-item state anxiety scale of the STICSA. It was created to measure the 
general cognitive and somatic symptoms of anxiety. The entire STICSA has been found to be 
more correlated with anxiety measures (rs ≥ .67) and less correlated with depression measures (rs 
≤ .61) than the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Respondents are asked to rate the items asking 
how true each statement is of them on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much 
so). Scores are obtained by adding the responses to the 21 items. A cut-off score of 43 is used for 
determining clinically significant levels of anxiety, while a cut-off score of 40 is used to detect 
possible presence of anxiety disorders (Gros et al., 2007). Anxiety could influence performance 
on the memory task, so by including this measure we can statistically control for the effect. 
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CAGE Assessment Substance Abuse Screening Tool. The CAGE is a 4-item self-report 
tool used for screening alcohol abuse. Individuals respond “yes” or “no” to a question about their 
alcohol use regarding whether they have ever tried to cut back, have ever been annoyed or 
angered when questioned about their use, have ever felt guilty about their use, and if they have 
ever had an eye-opener to get started in the morning. Scores can be totaled by counting the times 
the participant responded yes and range from 0-4. A score of 2 or more indicates probable 
alcohol abuse with a sensitivity of 74% and a specificity of 91% (Buchsbaum et al., 1991).  
Affect Grid. The Affect Grid is a single-item scale used to assess affect and consists of a 9 
x 9 grid with pleasure being rated from 1-9 on the horizontal axis and arousal being rated 1-9 on 
the vertical axis. Participants are asked to make a single rating by placing an x in one of the 
boxes on a 9 x 9 grid indicating their level of pleasure and arousal at that time. The Affect Grid 
has been shown to have adequate reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity for 
various uses as a state measure of mood (Russell, Weiss & Mendelsohn, 1989). Two scores are 
derived from this measure: ratings of experienced pleasure and arousal are taken from the 
position of the respondents mark and range from 1 - 9. Higher scores reflect more arousal and 
more pleasure. These ratings were used to assess the impact of the mood manipulation.  
DRM Word Lists. A modified version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) 
paradigm was used to investigate the differences in recall of presented words, recall of non-
presented words, and recall of critical lures in individuals who are not considered vulnerable to 
depression and those who are considered vulnerable to depression based on scores from a 
measure of rumination. Thirty lists were presented in each condition with 15 words in each list. 
List were taken from Storbeck and Clore (2005) and Joormann et al. (2009). Each list is 
associated with a critical lure which is never actually presented but is highly associated with the 
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words in the list. Five of the lists presented in each condition were positive, five were negative, 
with the remaining 20 being neutral. In each list, the first word presented was the most associated 
with the never presented critical lure. Then each word that was presented next became less 
associated with the critical lure, yet still related. The words were presented on a computer 
monitor for 250ms, one at a time. The presentation of stimuli for the memory task was 
programmed in E-prime. There was a 32ms delay between each word. After each list, 
participants were given 45s to list words recalled and words thought of by hand on the response 
sheet provided. At the end of 45s, a tone sounded that signaled the next list. All word lists were 
administered in the same manner.  
A research assistant checked with participants if any responses were illegible before 
recording the final score. The primary dependent measure was critical lures. The dependent 
measures described in the analyses below were the proportion of critical lures recalled in the 
seen column for each word list type (negative, neutral, positive). Other measures including 
correct recall, inclusion, list words thought of, and non-list words thought of were noted to check 
for alternative memory effects. No effects were found and those measures were not investigated 
further.  
Mood Induction 
 For the participants in the non-depressed groups, mood was manipulated with music and 
pictures before each list was presented. The negative mood in this study was tailored to be 
consistent with the literature and was a low arousal, negative mood (sadness). To induce negative 
mood, participants listened to Adagietto by Mahler for eight minutes before beginning the first 
trial while viewing negatively valenced pictures from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS) (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008). Niedenthal and Setterlund (1994) effectively induced 
negative mood with the Mahler piece. The positive mood in this study was also tailored to be 
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consistent with the literature and was a low arousal, positive mood (content). To induce positive 
mood, participants listened to Eine Kleine Nacht Musik by Mozart for eight minutes before 
beginning the first trial while viewing positively valenced pictures from the IAPS. Niedenthal, 
Halberstadt, and Setterlund (1997) effectively induced positive mood with the Mozart piece. 
Pictures were selected based on differences in pleasure ratings. Pictures rated high in pleasure 
were selected for the positive mood condition whereas pictures rated low in pleasure were 
selected for the negative mood condition. Participants listened to the same musical piece and 
viewed the same pictures relevant to assigned condition for one minute before every list 
following the first.  
Procedure  
 Participants were tested individually. Following informed consent, participants in the low 
and high rumination groups were randomly assigned to be induced into a negative mood or a 
positive mood before they began the task. Participants in the depressed group did not have a 
mood manipulation. Prior to receiving instructions and having mood manipulated, participants 
completed the BDI and the STICSA-State Version to assess current mood and the stability of 
depression. Only individuals whose scores on the BDI were consistent across the two 
measurement occasions (screening and lab administrations) were included in the final sample, 
bringing the total number of participants to 82. After the mood manipulation, participants in the 
mood manipulation conditions completed the affect grid to assess current mood. 
In each condition, participants received instructions to try and remember the words 
presented as they would be asked to recall them later. They were also told to remember any 
words that came to mind during the list presentation, if they should occur. There were two 
columns on the response sheet for participants to write the words they remembered, one for 
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words from the presented list (labeled list words) and one for words that were thought of but not 
presented (words thought of). This was done to determine whether critical lures came to mind 
and if participants could monitor the source of the words correctly. Before the 30 lists were 
presented and before the mood induction, all participants began with 2 practice trials using two 
neutral lists, as suggested by Roediger and McDermott (1995). The order of lists was 
counterbalanced for each participant. 
Results 
 A manipulation check was conducted by looking for mean differences on the responses to 
the affect grid. A 2 (emotion) x 2 (group: low vs. high rumination) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted on the pleasure ratings and arousal ratings from the affect grid. I 
hypothesized that participants would report more pleasure following the positive mood 
manipulation than the negative mood manipulation. There was a significant main effect for 
emotion for pleasure ratings, F(3, 57) = 122.29, p < .001. Participants in the positive mood 
condition rated their pleasure at an average of 8.04 (SD = 1.45) whereas those in the negative 
mood condition rated their pleasure at an average of 3.19 (SD = 1.78). No significant effects for 
rumination or the interaction of rumination and emotion were found for pleasure ratings (all ps > 
.05). There were no effects found for arousal ratings (all ps > .05). It appears that the mood 
induction had its intended effects as mood immediately following the induction differed between 
conditions in the appropriate direction.  
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to determine if there was a relationship 
between the primary individual difference measures (i.e. the anxiety, depression, and rumination 
scores) and memory performance. Of particular interest was the correlation between anxiety and 
false memories, as this would indicate whether the level of anxiety should be taken into account 
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in further analyses. All Pearson correlation coefficients can be found in Table 2. Anxiety was not 
significantly correlated with the negative word lists memory score, the neutral word lists memory 
score, or the positive word lists memory score (all ps > .05). Depression was not significantly 
correlated with the negative word lists memory score, the neutral word lists memory score, or the 
positive word lists memory score (all ps > .05). Rumination was significantly correlated with the 
neutral word lists memory score and the positive word lists memory score, but not with the 
negative word lists memory score.  
Table 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients among Dependent Variables 
 BDI STICSA RRS NEG-CL POS-CL NEU-CL 
BDI 1.000 .779*** .731*** -.104 -.120 -.201 
STICSA - 1.000 .649*** -.159 -.128 -.120 
RRS - - 1.000 -.145 -.284** -.336** 
NEG-CL - - - 1.000 .447 .529*** 
POS-CL - - - - 1.000 .625*** 
NEU-CL - - - - - 1.000 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; STICSA = State 
Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety-State Version; RRS = Ruminative Responses 
Scale; NEG-CL = proportion of negative critical lures; POS-CL = proportion of positive critical 
lures; NEU-CL = proportion of neutral critical lures. Means are provided with standard 
deviations in parentheses. 
 
A 2 (rumination: low vs. high) x 2 (emotion: negative vs. positive) x 3 (list type: 
negative, positive, neutral) mixed design ANOVA was conducted on the proportion of critical 
lures recalled, with list type as a repeated measure. A significant effect of rumination was found, 
F(1, 54) = 6.18, p = .016. High ruminators recalled fewer critical lures (M = .46, SD = .20) in 
comparison to low ruminators (M = .58, SD = .17). No significant effects for emotion, F(1, 54) = 
.49, p = .489, or the interaction of rumination and emotion, F(1, 54) = .75, p = .391, were found. 
There was no significant effect of list type, F(2, 108) = .84, p = .433, nor were the interactions of 
list type and rumination, F(2, 108) = 1.59, p = .209, list type and emotion, F(2, 108) = 1.45, p = 
.239, or list type, rumination and emotion, F(2, 108) = 1.20, p = .306, significant. The means and 
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standard deviations from this analysis are listed in Table 3. The results of this analysis do not 
confirm the hypothesis that those scoring high on a measure of rumination would recall more 
negative critical lures than those scoring low on a measure of rumination when induced into a 
negative mood.  
Table 3. Mean Critical Lures Recalled and (SDs) for Rumination x Emotion x List Type 
 Low Ruminators High Ruminators 
 Negative Mood Positive Mood Negative Mood Positive Mood 
NEG-CL .57 (.26) .51 (.26) .41 (.20) .53 (.29) 
POS-CL .63 (.20) .52 (.27) .46 (.24) .43 (.28) 
NEU-CL .66 (.18) .60 (.20) .49 (.19) .42 (.23) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. NEG-CL = proportion of 
negative critical lures; POS-CL = proportion of positive critical lures; NEU-CL = proportion of 
neutral critical lures. 
 
A second model was tested to investigate the hypothesis that those in the depressed group 
would recall more negative critical lures than those in the low rumination group induced into a 
negative mood but not differ from those in the high rumination group induced into a negative 
mood. A 3 (group: low ruminators in negative mood vs. high ruminators in negative mood vs. 
depressed) x 3 (list type: negative vs. positive vs. neutral) mixed design ANOVA was conducted 
with list type as a repeated measure. There was no effect for group, F(2, 52) = 2.16, p = .126, list 
type, F(2, 104) = 1.74, p = .180, or their interaction, F(4, 104) = .40, p = .807. The results of this 
analysis do not confirm the hypothesis. See Table 4 for values from this analysis.  
Table 4. Mean Critical Lures Recalled and (SDs) for Group x List Type 
 Group 
 LR-N HR-N DEP 
NEG-CL .54 (.27) .44 (.20) .46 (.25) 
POS-CL .59 (.17) .49 (.28) .43 (.26) 
NEU-CL .62 (.19) .53 (.21) .48 (.21) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. NEG-CL = proportion of 
negative critical lures; POS-CL = proportion of positive critical lures; NEU-CL = proportion of 
neutral critical lures; LR-N = low ruminators under negative mood; HR-N = high ruminators 
under negative mood; DEP = depressed.  
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Since depression has been previously shown to be associated with an increase in the 
recall of negative critical lures (Joormann et al., 2009) and ruminative thinking styles have been 
related to difficulties in inhibiting attention to negative information (Joormann, Levens, & 
Gotlib, 2011), it is possible that these two variables would interact to influence false memories. 
Post-hoc analyses were conducted to further investigate this possibility. In a regression model, 
RRS and BDI scores along with their interaction were standardized and entered simultaneously 
as continuous variables predicting each list type. RRS, BDI, nor their interaction significantly 
predicted critical lures for the negative lists (all ps > .05). When predicting critical lures for the 
positive lists, the overall model was significant, F(3, 81) = 2.969, p = .037. RRS was the only 
significant predictor, β = -.110, t = -2.725, p = .008. When predicting critical lures for the neutral 
lists, the overall model was significant, F(3, 81) = 3.553, p = .018. RRS was again the lone 
significant predictor, β = -.088, t = -2.636, p = .010. When controlling for depression, ruminators 
recall fewer critical lures. See Table 5 for values from this analysis. 
Table 5. Summary of Regression Analysis 
       B      SE       β        t   Sig. (p) 
NEG-CL 
    BDI .027 .053 .108 .509 .612 
    RRS -.040 .041 -.158 -.460 .340 
    BDIxRRS -.027 .035 -.130 -.770 .444 
POS-CL 
    BDI .071 .052 -.278 1.365 .176 
    RRS -.110 .040 -.430 -2.725 .008 
    BDIxRRS -.024 .035 -.112 -.694 .490 
NEU-CL 
    BDI .035 .043 .163 .807 .422 
    RRS -.088 .033 -.412 -2.636 .010 
    BDIxRRS -.015 .024 -.085 -.531 .547 
Note. NEG-CL = proportion of negative critical lures; POS-CL = proportion of positive critical 
lures; NEU-CL = proportion of neutral critical lures. 
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Discussion 
 The present study was designed to investigate whether individuals who are vulnerable to 
depression perform in a pattern similar to those diagnosed with major depressive disorder on a 
false memory task. In particular, it was hypothesized that being depressed or scoring high on a 
measure of rumination but having never been depressed would be associated with increased false 
recall of negative material, in particular negative critical lures when induced into negative mood.  
 Studies have been done to look at how healthy individuals induced into mood states 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005) and depressed individuals (Joormann et al., 2009) perform on a DRM 
task. The results have been opposing. In healthy individuals, Storbeck and Clore (2005) found 
that positive or neutral mood led to more false recall of critical lures than a sad mood. The 
authors attributed this finding to positive mood typically creating relational or global processing, 
whereas negative mood creates item-specific processing. Global processing allows for more 
things to come to mind (increased activation) and is less focused on particular stimuli, whereas 
item-specific processing does not allow for as much activation of related concepts. I did not find 
a similar effect.  
My findings show that regardless of what mood participants were in, they did not differ 
from one another because of it. There was an overall effect of rumination, such that high 
ruminators recalled fewer critical lures overall. It is curious to think about why high ruminators 
would recall fewer critical lures. It is possible that high ruminators may be more likely to engage 
in item-specific processing, regardless of mood. In other words, a ruminative thinking style may 
be associated with the repetitive focus on the specific content of the lists without making extra-
list associations.  
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Joormann and colleagues (2009) and Howe and Malone (2011) looked at depressed 
individuals compared to healthy controls and found the opposite of Storbeck and Clore (2005). 
Depression was associated with a higher probability of falsely recalling negative critical lures. I, 
again, did not find such an effect. There were no differences among my participants among the 
various list types.  
 The findings of Joormann et al. (2009) suggest that the cognitive biases associated with 
depression influence performance on this memory task in a way that is different from healthy 
individuals induced into mood states. What their findings do not tell us, however, is how this 
memory difference comes about. Is it that people with depression develop this as a symptom of 
their depression? Or is it something that preexists and contributes to the development of the 
disorder? This study intended to investigate that question. Being able to answer this question 
would also allow us to learn more about the causes and consequences of depression.  
 My results suggest that rumination influences the false memory effect independently of 
emotion and depression. In the future we need to learn more about how particular individuals 
think about the world and continue to do research on depression and its vulnerability factors. I 
found that rumination influenced false memories but independently of mood and depression. If 
my findings are valid, they tell me that the false memory effect in depression may have more to 
do with thinking style than with emotion. We could think in terms of semantic networks and how 
people think about categories of things regardless of what mood they are in. If future studies with 
sound samples and methods find that the proposed hypotheses are not supported, it is possible 
that one could assume the memory impairment is a symptom of depression. We could assume the 
impairment does not pre-exist the depressive episode and is not a vulnerability factor. Further 
studies need to be done in order to make a more accurate and confident assumption.  
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 There are a couple of important limitations to this study which preclude any strong 
conclusions. The first is that the memory deficit sought is a relatively small effect which was 
difficult to detect given the sample size. The group that was considered to be “depressed” was 
not a clinical sample and may not be comparable to the diagnosed samples with more severe 
levels of depression. It has been shown that mild to moderate levels of depression may not 
change cognitive functioning in the same way clinical depression would (Rokke et al., 2002). 
Future studies may find a clearer picture of this effect with the use of a clinical sample and wider 
range of rumination scores in the non-depressed sample. Lastly, mood was measured with an 
affect grid immediately following manipulation. I am unable to know how long the mood 
induction carried on throughout the experiment as the participants saw 30 lists of 15 words each 
presented in a random order. It is possible that the mood effect wore off before it was able to 
influence responses to the emotional lists.  
 It is possible that the null hypotheses of this study are true. I replicated the methods of 
previous studies and enhanced particular components but did not get any of the same effects. The 
previous findings of Storbeck and Clore (2005) and Joormann et al. (2009) are potentially 
unreliable and unable to be replicated. It could be that individuals who are depressed exhibit the 
false memory effect and individuals who are not depressed do not exhibit that same effect, even 
when considered vulnerable to depression.  
 The question this study intended to investigate is still an important one and future studies 
that are able to obtain a larger sample with a more accurate representation of rumination scores 
and depressed individuals will be able to help answer that question. Is the false memory effect 
that is present in depression a vulnerability factor for depression or a symptom of depression? 
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Knowing the answer to this question could help us to identify those who are at risk for a 
depressive episode or to help better treat those suffering from depression.  
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APPENDIX A. CONSENT FORM 
Title of Research Study:  False Memories in Depression: Vulnerability Factor or Symptom? 
This study is being conducted by:  Samantha Myhre, B.A., North Dakota State University, 
Graduate Student, Department of Psychology, samantha.myhre@my.ndsu.edu, and Paul Rokke, 
Ph.D, North Dakota State University, Department of Psychology, Principal Investigator, 
paul.rokke@ndsu.edu.  
Why am I being asked to take part in this research study?  You have been invited to 
participate in this study based on your responses to survey questionnaires. We want to ensure our 
participants represent a full range of responses to questionnaires about mood and coping styles. 
We have invited people who have had things going well or not so well as well as people who 
cope with negative events by thinking about them or distracting themselves from them. You are 
eligible to participate in this study because you are enrolled in an undergraduate psychology 
course that includes research participation as a requirement or offers extra-credit for 
participating.  You must be at least 18 years old and fluent in English to participate. 
What is the reason for doing the study?  Memory can be affected in many ways. Individuals 
therefore differ in the kinds of things they remember. Sometimes we remember things as they 
happen and other times we remember things differently from the way they happened. This study 
is being conducted to learn more about how individuals differ in the way they remember things.  
What will I be asked to do?  You will be asked to respond to questions about depressive and 
anxious symptoms. You will then be asked to complete a computerized memory task. You will 
be asked to memorize lists of words and be asked to recall them after. Before and during the task, 
you might listen to music and be presented with slides of pictures.   
Where is the study going to take place, and how long will it take?  The study will be 
conducted in the Psychology Lab in Minard Hall. The study will take approximately one hour 
and fifteen minutes to complete.  
What are the risks and discomforts?  It is not possible to identify all potential risks in research 
procedures, but we have taken reasonable safeguards to minimize any known risks. One 
foreseeable risk is that there may be questions which you do not feel comfortable answering. 
 
What are the benefits to me?  By participating in this research study, you may learn something 
about research methods in Psychology. You are not expected to benefit directly in any other way 
as a result of participating in this study.  
 
What are the benefits to other people?  We are conducting this study so that we may learn 
about how individuals, in particular college students, respond to a memory task. It is hoped that 
the knowledge gained will contribute to our understanding of individual differences in memory 
and may someday benefit people with memory problems. 
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Do I have to take part in the study?  Your participation in this research is your choice.  If you 
decide to participate in the study, you may change your mind and stop participating at any time 
without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are already entitled. 
What are the alternatives to being in this research study?  There are other studies to 
participate in besides this one.  In addition, every psychology instructor will have specified 
alternative means for satisfying course requirements or earning extra credit.  Please see your 
course syllabus or visit with your instructor to learn about these options. 
Who will see the information that I give?  All information collected in this study will remain 
completely confidential.  All forms and data will be marked with a unique code.  Names and 
identifying information will not be stored with the data.  Only authorized research personnel will 
have access to the data.  When reporting on the results of this study the data will be reported only 
in summary form, combining the information collected from all participants. 
Will I receive any compensation for taking part in this study?  Participants in this study may 
choose to receive either $10.00 or 5 points of credit for participating in this study.   
What if I have questions? Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the 
research study, please ask any questions that might come to mind now.  Later, if you have any 
questions about the study, you can contact the researcher, Samantha Myhre, at 
samantha.myhre@my.ndsu.edu or the principal investigator, Paul D. Rokke, at 
Paul.Rokke@ndsu.edu, or 701.231-8626. 
What are my rights as a research participant? You have rights as a participant in research. If 
you have questions about your rights, or complaints about this research [may add, “or to report a 
research-related injury” if applicable], you may talk to the researcher or contact the NDSU 
Human Research Protection Program by: 
 Telephone: 701.231.8908 or toll-free 1.855.800.6717 
 Email: ndsu.irb@ndsu.edu 
 Mail:  NDSU HRPP Office, NDSU Dept. 4000, PO Box 6050, Fargo, ND 58108-
6050. 
 
The role of the Human Research Protection Program is to see that your rights are protected in 
this research; more information about your rights can be found at:  www.ndsu.edu/irb.  
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Documentation of Informed Consent: 
You are freely making a decision whether to be in this research study.  Signing this form means 
that  
1. you have read and understood this consent form 
2. you have had your questions answered, and 
3. you have decided to be in the study. 
 
You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
 
              
Your signature        Date 
 
 
         
Your printed name  
 
 
              
Signature of researcher explaining study     Date 
 
 
         
Printed name of researcher explaining study 
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APPENDIX B. RUMINATIVE RESPONSES SCALE (RRS) 
 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each of the 
items below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost always think or 
do each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not 
what you think you should do. 
 
1 almost never 2 sometimes 3 often 4 almost always 
 
1. think about how alone you feel 
2. think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this” 
3. think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness 
4. think about how hard it is to concentrate 
5. think “What am I doing to deserve this?” 
6. think about how passive and unmotivated you feel. 
7. analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed 
8. think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore 
9. think “Why can’t I get going?” 
10. think “Why do I always react this way?” 
11. go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way 
12. write down what you are thinking about and analyze it 
13. think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better 
14. think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.” 
15. think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?” 
16. think “Why can’t I handle things better?” 
17. think about how sad you feel. 
18. think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes 
19. think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything 
20. analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed 
21. go someplace alone to think about your feelings 
22. think about how angry you are with yourself 
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APPENDIX C. CAGE ASSESSMENT 
 
C  
 
Have you ever tried to Cut back on your use?  
 
A  
 
Have you ever been Annoyed/Angered when questioned about your use?  
 
G  
 
Have you ever felt Guilt about your use?  
 
E  
 
Have you ever had an Eye-opener to get started in the morning?  
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APPENDIX D. BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY (BDI) 
 
Date __________________                                                                       S# _______      
 
     On this questionnaire are groups of statements.  Please read each group of statements 
carefully.  Then pick out the one statement in each group which best describes the way you have 
been feeling the PAST WEEK, INCLUDING TODAY!  Circle the number beside the statement 
that you picked.  If several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle each one.  
Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your choice. 
 
 
  1.  0  I do not feel sad. 
       1  I feel sad. 
       2  I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it. 
       3  I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
 
  2.  0  I am not particularly discouraged about the future. 
       1  I feel discouraged about the future. 
       2  I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
       3  I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
      
  3.  0  I do not feel like a failure.   
       1  I feel I have failed more than the average person.      
       2  As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
       3  I feel I am a complete failure as a person. 
 
  4.  0  I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to. 
       1  I don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
       2  I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
       3  I am dissatisfied or bored with everything. 
 
  5.  0  I don't feel particularly guilty. 
       1  I feel guilty a good part of the time. 
       2  I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
       3  I feel guilty all of the time. 
 
  6.  0  I don't feel I am being punished. 
       1  I feel I may be punished. 
       2  I expect to be punished. 
       3  I feel I am being punished. 
 
  7.  0  I don't feel disappointed in myself. 
       1  I am disappointed in myself. 
       2  I am disgusted with myself. 
       3  I hate myself. 
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  8.  0  I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else. 
       1  I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes. 
       2  I blame myself all the time for my faults. 
       3  I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
 
  9.  0  I don't have any thoughts about killing myself. 
       1  I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would never carry them out.   
       2  I would like to kill myself. 
3  I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
 
 10. 0  I don't cry any more than usual. 
       1  I cry more now than I used to. 
       2  I cry all the time now. 
       3  I used to be able to cry, but now I can't even though I want to. 
 
 11. 0  I am no more irritated now than I ever am. 
       1  I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to. 
       2  I feel irritated all the time now. 
       3  I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me. 
 
 12. 0  I have not lost interest in other people. 
       1  I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
       2  I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
       3  I have lost all of my interest in other people. 
 
 13. 0  I make decisions about as well as I ever could. 
       1  I put off making decisions more than I used to. 
       2  I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before. 
       3  I can't make decisions at all anymore. 
 
 14. 0  I don't feel I look any worse than I used to. 
       1  I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
       2  I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me unattractive. 
       3  I believe that I look ugly. 
 
 15. 0  I can work about as well as before. 
       1  It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something. 
       2  I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
       3  I can't do any work at all. 
 
 16.  0  I can sleep as well as usual.   
       1  I don't sleep as well as I used to. 
       2  I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep. 
       3  I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep. 
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 17. 0  I don't get more tired than usual. 
       1  I get tired more easily than I used to. 
       2  I get tired from doing almost anything. 
       3  I am too tired to do anything. 
 
 18. 0  My appetite is no worse than usual. 
       1  My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
       2  My appetite is much worse now. 
       3  I have no appetite at all anymore. 
 
 19. 0  I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately. 
       1  I have lost more than 5 pounds. 
       2  I have lost more than 10 pounds. 
       3  I have lost more than 15 pounds. 
 
I am purposely trying to lose weight.  Yes ____   No ____ 
 
 20. 0  I am no more worried about my health than usual. 
       1  I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains; or upset stomach; or 
constipation. 
       2  I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of much else. 
       3  I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything else. 
 
 21. 0  I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
       1  I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
       2  I am much less interested in sex now. 
       3  I have lost interest in sex completely. 
  
  
 
32 
 
APPENDIX E. STATE TRAIT INVENTORY FOR COGNITIVE AND SOMATIC ANXIETY 
(STICSA-STATE VERSION) 
 
Instructions 
Below is a list of statements which can be used to describe how people feel. 
Beside each statement are four numbers which indicate how often each statement is true of you 
(e.g., 1 _ not at all, 4 _ very much so). Please read each statement carefully and circle the number 
which best indicates how you feel right now, at this very moment, even if this is not how you 
usually feel. 
 
1 Not at all 2 A little  3 Moderately 4 Very much so  
 
1. My heart beats fast. 1 2 3 4 
2. My muscles are tense. 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel agonized over my problems. 1 2 3 4 
4. I think that others won’t approve of me. 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel like I’m missing out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel dizzy. 1 2 3 4 
7. My muscles feel weak. 1 2 3 4 
8. I feel trembly and shaky. 1 2 3 4 
9. I picture some future misfortune. 1 2 3 4 
10. I can’t get some thought out of my mind. 1 2 3 4 
11. I have trouble remembering things. 1 2 3 4 
12. My face feels hot. 1 2 3 4 
13. I think that the worst will happen. 1 2 3 4 
14. My arms and legs feel stiff. 1 2 3 4 
15. My throat feels dry. 1 2 3 4 
16. I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
17. I cannot concentrate without irrelevant thoughts intruding. 1 2 3 4 
18. My breathing is fast and shallow. 1 2 3 4 
19. I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like to. 1 2 3 4 
20. I have butterflies in the stomach. 1 2 3 4 
21. My palms feel clammy. 1 2 3 4 
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APPENDIX F. AFFECT GRID 
Participant #: ________ 
Date:_______________ 
 
Condition:         
 
Affect Grid 
 
 
 
 
        
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
 
 
 
High  
Arousal 
Stress 
Unpleasant 
Feelings 
Depressed 
Pleasant 
Feelings 
Excitement 
Relaxation Low Arousal 
(Drowsy) 
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APPENDIX G. WORD LISTS 
 
Negative Word Lists: 
ANGER TRASH BLACK SAD THIEF 
mad garbage white unhappy steal 
fear waste dark bad robber 
hate can cat cry crook 
rage refuse charred miserable burglar 
temper sewage night triste money 
fury bag funeral death cop 
ire junk color lonely bad 
wrath rubbish grief misery rob 
happy sweep blue sorrow jail 
fight scraps death sorry gun 
hatred pile ink dejected villain 
mean dump bottom downcast crime 
calm landfill coal good bank 
emotion debris brown tear bandit 
enrage litter gray lonesome criminal 
     
Positive Word Lists: 
HAPPY GIRL SOFT SWEET MUSIC 
content boy hard sour note 
gay dolls light candy sound 
glad female pillow sugar piano 
joy young plush bitter sing 
birthday dress loud good radio 
pleased pretty cotton taste band 
smile hair fur tooth melody 
good niece touch nice horn 
laugh dance fluffy honey concert 
life beautiful feather soda instrument 
melody cute furry chocolate symphony 
calm date downy heart jazz 
miserable aunt kitten cake orchestra 
sunshine daughter skin tarte art 
wonderful sister tender pie rhythm 
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Neutral Word Lists: 
WINDOW SMELL SMOKE SLEEP DOCTOR 
door nose cigarette bed nurse 
glass breathe puff rest sick 
pane sniff blaze awake lawyer 
shade aroma billows tired medicine 
ledge hear pollution dream health 
sill see ashes wake hospital 
house nostril cigar snooze dentist 
open whiff chimney blanket physician 
curtain scent fire doze ill 
frame reek tobacco slumber patient 
view stench stink snore office 
breeze fragrance pipe nap stethoscope 
sash perfume lungs peace surgeon 
screen salts flames yawn clinic 
shutter rose stain drowsy cure 
 
CHAIR CITY CUP MOUNTAIN PEN 
table town mug hill pencil 
sit crowded saucer valley write 
legs state tea climb fountain 
seat capital measuring summit lead 
couch streets coaster top quill 
desk subway lid molehill felt 
recliner country handle peak bic 
sofa new york coffee plain scribble 
wood village straw glacier crayon 
cushion metropolis goblet goat cross 
swivel big soup bike tip 
stool chicago stein climber marker 
sitting suburb drink range red 
rocking county plastic steep cap 
bench urban sip ski letter 
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RIVER CAR RUBBER BREAD SHIRT 
water truck elastic butter blouse 
stream bus bounce food sleeves 
lake train gloves eat pants 
mississippi automobile tire sandwich tie 
boat vehicle ball rye button 
tide drive eraser jam shorts 
swim jeep springy milk iron 
flow ford foam flour polo 
run race galoshes jelly collar 
barge keys soles dough vest 
creek garage latex crust pocket 
brook highway glue slice jersey 
fish sedan flexible wine belt 
bridge van resilient loaf linen 
winding taxi stretch toast cuffs 
 
HIGH FRUIT LION ROUGH FLAG 
low apple tiger smooth banner 
clouds vegetable circus bumpy Americans 
up orange jungle road symbol 
tall kiwi tamer tough stars 
tower citrus den sandpaper anthem 
jump ripe cub jagged stripes 
above pear Africa ready pole 
building banana mane coarse wave 
noon berry cage uneven raised 
cliff cherry feline riders national 
sky basket roar rugged checkered 
over juice fierce sand emblem 
airplane salad bears boards sign 
dive bowl hunt ground freedom 
elevate cocktail pride gravel pendant 
 
 
